Building Energy Resilience from the Seabed Up
15 July 2024
Author: Amb. Andris Piebalgs, Dr. Benjamin L. Schmitt, and Dr. Frank Umbach
The EU should build resilience into energy infrastructure, strengthen cooperation between institutions and industry, and maintain sustained economic pressure on Russia to prevent further weaponising of energy resources.
For over a century, Russian strategists have understood the critical role of energy, especially electricity, in national cohesion and resiliency. Lenin famously identified national electrification, together with Soviet power, as the critical element in building Communism. The corollary, that in conflict or war energy infrastructure is a critical target in breaking an enemy’s capacity or will to resist, is center stage today at a time when modern technology and the increasing role of electricity in everyday life have magnified the opportunity and challenges posed by the energy weapon. Putin’s use of energy so far is a logical extension of Lenin’s insight into modern conflict.
First, by gradually ensnaring Europe in deep dependency on Russian energy to sustain its industry and warm its homes, giving the Kremlin political leverage on the West.
Then by targeting Ukrainian energy infrastructure to disrupt defence and industrial capacity and civilian life and weaken morale.
And in suspected hybrid attacks from the Baltic to the United Kingdom – some relatively low-level, others more impactful – that so far appear to be a shot across the bow and warning of things to come to forestall more forceful actions from NATO and the European Union to support Ukraine.
In this publication, three experts on energy and infrastructure security – from Latvia, Germany and the United States – examine Russian strategies to date, analyze recent Russian actions in Europe, confirmed and suspected, and discuss ways Europe and the U.S., as nations and in multinational organizations like NATO and the EU, can harden their energy infrastructure, build in resilience, and devalue, dissuade and if necessary, defeat the Russian threat. As we build out clean offshore energy infrastructure to reduce dangerous dependencies, meet growing electricity demands, and improve net energy security, addressing vulnerabilities of both old and new systems is critical.
Their key recommendations, as the EU enters a new policy cycle and NATO’s Washington Summit kicks off, are listed below.
Our interconnected energy infrastructure is vulnerable not just to cyber but also physical threats, particularly as we invest in the necessary expansion of our offshore wind and grid capacity. While cyber protection must remain a priority and evolve to match the threat, we need policies and technical solutions that can help protect critical infrastructure from physical attacks and sabotage.
Resilience must be integral to the design of the energy sector, with all stakeholders involved, and will cost money and change investment and ROI assumptions. When deploying or upgrading critical infrastructure, resilience capabilities should be adequately financed, installed and integrated “by design” by public and private actors.
Russia’s targeting of Ukraine’s energy system underlines the importance of diversified energy infrastructure, interconnectivity, flexibility resources, distributed generation, and a secure and steady supply of replacement parts and repair materials such as power cables, transformers, and generators.
NATO and the EU should increase their support for the protection of Ukraine’s energy infrastructure through further investments in both active air defense, counter-drone, and passive defense systems. The West must learn from Ukraine’s example that the protection of energy infrastructure is a high priority to deter the Kremlin and defeat Russia’s strategy.
Infrastructure resilience challenges existing institutional boundaries. Progress has been made, but even greater communication and cooperation between the EU, NATO and industry is essential to create synergies through collective action and must be increased, building on the 2023 launch of the EU-NATO Task Force on Resilience of Critical Infrastructure and other recent NATO and EU initiatives.
EU and NATO members need holistic national security concepts that include effective crisis mechanisms, with clearly defined responsibilities for operators of critical infrastructure and national and regional administrations, and effective points of contact for NATO and EU institutions.
NATO must take action to ensure the expansion and enhanced physical monitoring and protection of its own energy network. The Alliance should work to push forward vital investments, such as increasing the involvement of the commercial geospatial industry in critical infrastructure.
Antimonopoly policy frameworks deployed as part of the EU’s Third Energy Package have been effective at undermining Russia’s ability to use energy as a geopolitical tool. Energy market liberalization must be sustained to support economic security.
Sanctions and technology export controls enforcement aimed at Russia’s energy sector must be sustained, as they can have a direct impact in supporting Ukraine on the battlefield. Transatlantic leaders must remain firm that there can be no return to “energy business as usual” with Putin’s Kremlin.